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Article 7

Re McCreath
By M. C. CULLITY*
It seems unlikely that the federal government lost many supporters when
it decided to abolish its integrated system of estate and gift taxation.1 Such
taxes have their advocates 2 but most taxpayers probably regard death duties
as among the most obnoxious methods ever devised for the purpose of filling
the coffers of the State. They are exceedingly visible, they are levied at a time
when emotions may be highly charged and they can involve the expropriation
of large amounts of capital. Rarely, if ever, can they be justified in terms of
the revenue they raise and, to some, their advocates seem motivated by "envy
nourished by political demagoguery, and carried to the point of vindictiveness." 3 The disastrous effect on family farms and family businesses is usually
an article of faith rather than a conclusion drawn from evidence but it is,
nonetheless, one which is firmly held in many jurisdictions.
Against such reactions and convictions, the reasoned arguments of the
supporters of death taxes are likely to have little effect. "Most of us judge
tax measures - in general quite correctly - by their results not by their
underlying conformity to principle. If we do not like the result, we are unlikely to accept the rationale."'4 It is not altogether surprising that the arguments for death taxes or other taxes on capital transfers are rarely ventilated
at the political level in Canada. When the federal government entered the
succession duties field in 1941 the Minister of Finance went to some trouble
to deny that anything but the exigencies of wartime and a consequent "compelling need for revenue" were responsible for the decision. At the same time,
and with some disregard for consistency, the Minister indicated also that the
government had no intention of limiting the operation of the Dominion Succession Duty Act to the duration of the war.
Over the last ten years very little has been predictable in the area of tax
reform and there must be few who have followed the developments since the
publication of the Carter Report who would now be prepared to forecast that
the federal government will re-enter the field of capital transfer taxes in the
foreseeable future. What does seem to be predictable is that, if this does not
occur, Canada will become one of the few developed countries in which
unlimited amounts of capital may be passed on from one generation to the
© Copyright, 1977, M. C. Cullity.
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
1Federal gift tax is not levied with respect to gifts made after 1971: Income Tax
Application Rules, 1971, section 140. Similarly, estate tax is not levied with respect to
the estates of persons who die after 1971: S.C. (1970-71-72) c. 63 s. 2.
2 See, e.g., the discussion in 1971 Conference Report (Canadian Tax Foundation)
at 6-67.
3 Id. at 27 (Dan Throop Smith).
4 Id. at 8 (Richard M. Bird).
5 Can.: H. of C. Deb., April 29, 1941, at 2349-50.
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next without the taxation of anything but its appreciation in value in the
hands of the donor or in those of a spouse predecessor in title. To a large
extent, this has already happened. Of the nine provinces which were in the
field at the end of 1972, the four Maritime provinces have since withdrawn,
British Columbia has announced its intention to withdraw retroactively to
January 24, 1977 and a similar statement was made by the Finance Minister
of Saskatchewan on March 10 of this year. Unless the government of Quebec
reverses the policy of its predecessor, that province will cease to levy either
gift taxes or succession duties after the end of 1977.6 In Ontario the combined
effect of the exemption for estates with an aggregate value of $300,000 or
less, the complete spousal exemption and the provisions which permit forgiveness of duty on family farms and small businesses, has significantly reduced the impact of the Succession Duty Act. At the time of writing, Manitoba is the only province in which there is no discernible movement in the
direction of abolition. With the withdrawal of the other provinces such a
development in Ontario and Manitoba seems almost inevitable.
If the importance of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Re McCreath7 were to be judged solely against this background it could be
described simply as a curiosity: as a case in which several million dollars of
duty might well have been collected without litigation under the death tax
legislation of almost any other common law jurisdiction but which nearly
escaped the net thrown by that misshapen monstrosity - the Succession
Duty Act of Ontario. The decision is interesting in other respects and these
transcend both its facts and the technical questions of interpretation which
were in issue.
The decision of Fraser J. at first instance s and some of the specific
problems which emerge from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
have been discussed elsewhere. 9 The wider implications of the Supreme
Court's decision merit a further brief comment. These concern the court's
attitude to statutory interpretation, to the doctrine of precedent and to its
responsibility to clarify and to declare the law. Of course, one or more of
these issues will be relevant in most of the cases which come before the
court. The unusual features of Re McCreath are f at they were raised so
starkly, that the opposing arguments were so finely balanced and that the
reasoning of the majority of the court on the first and second of the questions departs radically from the approach previously adopted in Canadian
cases on death duties.
The sole question which the court had to decide was whether the cor6The Quebec Budget of April 12, 1977 announced that "Succession Duties will
remain frozen at their present level until the current studies on the income tax structure
have been completed."
7
,Sub. nona. Minister of Revenue for Ontario v. McCreath (1976), 67 D.L.R. (3d)
449 (S.C.C.); rev'g 37 D..R. (3d) 78n; [1973] 3 O.R. 413n; [1976] C.T.C. 178, dismissing on appeal from, 32 D.L.R. (3d) 393; [1973] 1 O.R. 771; [1976] C.T.C. 157.
8 [1973] 1 O.R. 771 (Ont. H.C.); 32 D.L.R. (3d) 393; [1976] C.T.C. 157.
9 Cullity, M. C., Re McCreath (1973), 11 Osgoode Hall L.. 316; I Provincial
Inheritanceand Gift Tax Reporter (CCH) para. 20,028.
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pus of a trust created by the deceased some twenty years before her death
was deemed to pass on her death for the purpose of succession duty. Like
most death tax statutes, the Succession Duty Act of Ontario recaptures dispositions inter vivos which were made by the deceased if he or she retained
an interest in the property until death.' 0 In addition, the Act attaches the same
consequences to trusts under which the deceased retained a power of resettlement." Another provision of the Act exempts inter vivos dispositions if
the deceased was excluded from the property or from any benefit from it
within the five years immediately before death.12 This also has its counterparts in legislation in other jurisdictions but, in Ontario, it has one important
peculiarity. In most death tax statutes the provision is in a positive or recapturing form: it brings back into the notional estate the subject matter of
inter vivos gifts if the deceased was not excluded from the property or from
a benefit within the statutory period. In Ontario the, provision is negative in
form: it confers an exemption if the deceased was so excluded.
The genesis of these provisions lies in the Custom and Inland Revenue
Acts of 1881 and 1889 of the United Kingdom. In the parent legislation each
was expressed in the positive form and as such they were complementary. If
the deceased had disposed of certain proprietary interests in an asset while
retaining others for the period of his life the disposition was, in effect,
ignored for the purpose of death duties. If, as would usually be the case, he
was the absolute owner of the asset prior to the disposition, the value of the
absolute interest would be recaptured. The obvious policy behind the provision was to treat as if it were part of the testamentary estate any property in
which the deceased retained an enforceable right to possession or enjoyment
which would disappear when he died. A disposition with such a reservation
of an interest could be regarded as sufficiently close to a testamentary disposition to justify taxation on death.
In its positive form the second provision was treated by the courts as
reflecting a legislative awareness that, notwithstanding that no proprietary
interest was reserved, a person might still obtain benefits from property of
which he or she had disposed. If such benefits were received within the statutory period, the disposition would be ignored to the same extent as if an
interest had been reserved. Thus, taken together, the provisions were regarded
as recapturing the subject-matter of dispositions if the deceased retained a life
interest or received a benefit within the statutory period. This general view
of the policy of the provisions allowed them to be construed in accordance
with strict principles of property law and, consequently, provided a fair degree of predictability for professionals concerned with estate planning. It will
be noted, however, that because the provisions were complementary to each
other and did not overlap, it was important that each should be framed as a
recapturing provision. If, as ultimately occurred in Ontario, the second provision was turned around and expressed so as to confer an exemption if the
deceased was excluded within the statutory period, the traditional approach to
10 R.S.O. 1970,

c. 449, para. I(r) (x) [S.O. 1960, c. 386, para. 1(p) (viii)].

11 Id.
12 Id., para. 5(1) (g) [id., para. 5(1) (g)].
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the construction of the provisions would have the result that a disposition
recaptured by the first provision would be exempt under the second. A person who reserved a life interest would normally be excluded from any benefit
out of the remainder interests of which he had disposed. Under the second
provision it was well established by Canadian decisions as well as those of
English, Australian and New Zealand courts that the only relevant benefit
was one which arose out of the property interests which had actually been
included in the disposition. 13 A benefit from an interest which had been
retained by the settlor would give rise to recapture only under the first of the
provisions and this would be of no significance if the corpus would be exempt
under the second provision.
The possible flaw in the statute does not appear to have been raised in
the years between the enactment of the exemption and the appeal to the
Supreme court of Ontario in Re McCreath.'4 Despite the many decisions
which established the traditional interpretation of the words of the second
provision, from a planning viewpoint there was an obvious risk that a court
would be reluctant to hold that the first provision was virtually ineffective.
With two qualifications the facts of Re McCreath raised the question
quite neatly. Under the trust the deceased was, until her death, one of a class
of income beneficiaries and might therefore be regarded as having reserved
an interest for the purpose of the recapturing provision. As she did not receive any benefit which entrenched upon the capital interest of the persons
who were to receive the capital on her death, it could still be argued that the
corpus of the trust was exempt.
The first qualification is that the distribution of the income during the
deceased's lifetime lay within the trustee's discretion and no beneficiary had
any right to demand any amount. On this ground it could be, and was, argued
that no "interest" in the strict proprietary sense was reserved by the deceased.
The second qualification arises from the fact that the deceased retained
a special power of appointment over the capital. While such a power could
not be exercised for her own benefit, there was the possibility that a court
might hold that the exemption was lost on the ground that the deceased had
not been excluded from the property. On the basis of the earlier authorities
it might have been predicted that the beneficiaries would not succeed on the
first of these arguments but that the exemption would not have been withheld
simply because of the existence of the power of appointment. In the Supreme
Court of Canada the beneficiaries were unsuccessful on both points. The first
was disposed of in orthodox fashion: English decisions, which extend the
normal concept of a proprietary interest to include the "interest" of a beneficiary of discretionary trust of income, were followed.' 5
On the second point, the only decision which would seem to give any
strong support to an argument for withholding the exemption because of the
13 Cullity, Osgoode Hall L.J., supra, note 8 at 319.
14 The possibility was mentioned in Cullity, "Trusts Inter Vivos," Estate Planning

Seminars (Toronto: York University, 1972) at 44-45.
16 Culllty, Osgoode Hall LJ., supra, note 8 at 318.
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retention of the special power was that of Chick v. Commissioner of Stamp
Duties.'0 In that case the Privy Council distinguished between "exclusion
from the property" and "exclusion from a benefit from the property" and
held that recapture under a provision in the positive form would occur if the
deceased had not been excluded in each respect. The Chick case was clearly
inconsistent with the approach adopted in earlier Canadian, English and
17
Australian cases and was quickly superseded by legislation in England.
Although it was referred to without disapproval by Fraser I. at first instance
it was not mentioned in either of the judgments delivered in the Supreme
Court of Canada. Each of those judgments adopts an entirely novel interpretation of the words of the exemption.
The court was faced with a considerable dilemma. If the traditional approach to the interpretation of the statutory language was adopted, the recapturing provision would have little, if any, effect. Such a conclusion would
be in breach of the normal presumption that Parliament generally intends the
words it enacts to have some meaning and application. Yet if the presumption was to be applied and the traditional construction rejected, it would be
necessary to attribute a more limited scope to the exempting provision. How
was this to be achieved without ignoring completely the words of the Act?
Counsel for the Minister produced an ingenious answer which, like the argument for the beneficiaries, relied upon the unusual and tortuous structure of
the statute. In order to avoid the possibility that the legislation might be held
to impose an indirect tax or one which was not "within the province" the
charging section was designed so that the duty is levied either upon property
:which is situated within the province and which passes on death or upon
residents of the province who are the recipients of transmissions or certain
lifetime dispositions made by the deceased.' 8 This distinction between levying
duty on property and levying duty on persons also appears in the opening
words of the exempting provision:
No duty shall be levied on any of the following property, .. . nor on any person
to whom any of the following dispositions are made, with respect to such dispositions, and such property and dispositions shall not be included in the aggregate
value nor included for the purpose of determining any rate of duty, .... 10

The distinction is continued in the specific paragraphs which follow. Paragraph (a), for example, refers to "any disposition for religious, charitable or
educational purposes . . ." while paragraph (b) covers "any property devised

or bequeathed by the deceased for religious, charitable or educational purposes ....

"

The paragraph in issue in Re McCreath read as follows:

Any disposition where actual and bona fide enjoyment and possession of the
property in respect of which the disposition is made, was assumed more than five
years before the date of death of the deceased by the person to whom the disposition is made, or by a trustee for such person, and thenceforward retained to

10 [1958] A.C. 435 (P.C.).

17 See Lauday, D. J. and Mann, E. J. (eds.), Green's Death Duties (7th ed., London: Butterworths, 1971) at 141.
Is R.S.O. 1970, c. 449, section 6 [R.S.O. 1960, c. 386, section 61.
19 Id., section 5(1) [id., para. 5(l)(g)].
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the entire exclusion of the deceased or of any benefit to him whether voluntary
or by contract or otherwise; 2o

As there was no provision which was expressed to exempt property which is
the subject matter of such a disposition as distinct from exempting persons
who have made such dispositions, and as the Minister had purported to levy
the duty on the property, it was argued that there was no exemption applicable to the facts of the case. It will be noted that the argument did not deny
that the provision, which in terms confers an exemption upon the recipients
of dispositions, was to be given its traditional interpretation; what was denied
was its application to cases where duty is levied on property situate in Ontario
rather than on persons who are resident here.
Obviously, there was nothing which could be regarded as unorthodox in
either of the opposing arguments. The beneficiaries relied upon decisions
under very similar provisions in other statutes. The Minister attempted to
distinguish those decisions on the basis of the different structure of the statute
and of words which had no counterparts in the legislation in other jurisdictions. If there were no other relevant implications in the statute the Minister's
argument might well have been regarded as compelling, but it too would
have led to anomalous results. In certain cases the Act levies duty on property
which is situate in Ontario and which was disposed of inter vivos by the
deceased. 21 In such cases the duty cannot be levied on the person who receives the property. On the basis of the Minister's argument it would seem
that, even though such a disposition might have been made to the total exclusion of the deceased any number of years before the deceased's death, it
would be recaptured. It would, of course, be possible for the legislature to
intend to impose succession duties on property disposed of absolutely and
without strings fifty years before the deceased's death but this would be unusual; it would create considerable difficulties for the deceased's personal
representatives and it would be anomalous in the light of the exemption given
to persons who are the recipients of other lifetime dispositions.
In the result, therefore, the Supreme Court of Canada was faced with
two quite powerful arguments constructed along quite orthodox lines. One
argument supported the existence of an exemption; the other led to a denial
of any exemption; and each would have produced anomalous results. In such
a situation an observer might have been justified in thinking that previous
cases indicated how such a difficulty in the construction of a taxing Act and,
in particular an Act which imposes death duties, would
be resolved. The
22
principle was stated by Schroeder JA. in Re Odette:
Even if I am in error in the construction which I would place upon the provisions. . ., it is at least highly doubtful that the language of the enactment extends
unambiguously to [the property in question].... In that view the case is one of
doubtful interpretation and the doubt should be resolved in favour of the re23
spondent.

20 Id., para. 5(l)(g) Ud., para. 5(l)(g)].

21 Id., paras. I(r) (xi), 1 (r) (xii) [id., paras. I(p) (ix), I (p) (x)].
22 [1965] 2 O.R. 713 (CA.).
23
Id. at 719-21 and see McGillivray J.A., at 721.
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The judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada was reserved for almost
twelve months. When delivered, it reversed the decision of the Ontario Court
of Appeal and held that the exemption was not available. The court rejected
both the traditional interpretation of the words of the relevant provision and
the Minister's argument that it did not apply where duty was levied on
property situate in Ontario. A third alternative construction was approved.
The foundation of the argument for the beneficiaries was that the
"property" from which the deceased had to be excluded consisted of the
particular proprietary interests which were comprised in the disposition. As
interests which she had reserved were not included in the subject matter of
the disposition, any benefit derived from such interests would not exclude
the application of the exemption. It followed that her receipt of income within
the five year period was irrelevant. Despite the numerous authorities which
provided strong persuasive support for this interpretation,24 it was rejected.
The court held that the property which had been disposed of consisted of the
common shares which the trustees had received.2 By virtue of her receipt of
income from the shares the deceased had benefitted from the subject matter
of the disposition. In addition the existence of the special power of appointment over the shares was regarded as sufficient to justify the conclusion that
she was not excluded from the property.
Whenever the donor fails to divest himself or herself of control of or income
benefits from the property, the section is inapplicable to exempt from tax, . . .20

Obviously, there is much that is attractive in this approach. In the past,
judicial attitudes to the construction of death tax statutes in Canada, and in
other Commonwealth
countries, have been notorious for their excessive positivism. 27 As a result tax avoidance schemes have been designed and upheld
on the basis of the most convoluted arguments, the most arid technicalities
and the most esoteric principles of property law.28 In Re McCreath this
24

See the discussion by Fraser J.: [1973]1 O.R. 771 (Ont. H.C.) at 786-95.
6 at 465 (Dickson J., (1976), 67 D.L.R. (3d) 449).
d. at 446.
27 "What does this come to? It means that, in order to avoid estate duty, the lawyer
turns magician. He advises his client to execute a revocable settlement, and in an instant,
before our very eyes, the contingent capital interest is gone. No one can see it. It is
replaced by a continuous life interest. No estate duty is payable. And then, whilst we sit
admiring the performance, wondering what is coming next, he can, when he pleases,
bring back the capital interest. He advises his client to revoke the settlement, with, of
course, the consent of his co-trustee, and at once the capital interest is there intact. It
makes me rub my eyes. I cannot believe it is true. Those near me acclaim the feat. But
I do not. I have a feeling that the contingent capital interest remained there all the time,
cloaked by a revocable sub-settlement. Pull the covering aside and you will see it as it
really is, a contingent capital interest which became absolute on the father's death; and
on which, therefore, estate duty is payable.": Morgan v. Inland Revenue Commissioners,
[1963] Ch. 438, at 458 per Lord Denning M.R. (dissenting); "The argument in this
appeal is not about 'How many angels can stand on the point of a needle'. It is about
Z26,000"; Re Kilpatrick's Policies Trusts, [1966] Ch. 730, at 763 per Diplock LJ.
28
E.g., in Re Kilpatrick's Policies Trusts, supra, note 26, the decision turned on the
application of the rule in Phipps v. Ackers (1842), 9 Cl. & Fin. 583 (H.L.) and the distinction between contingent interests and interests which are vested but liable to be
divested.
25
Supra, note
20
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approach was repudiated with some emphasis. 29 In this respect the reasoning
in the decision is consistent with the general trend in the Supreme Court's
attitude towards the construction of other taxing statutes over the last ten
years and in both its style and content it bears a much greater similarity to
judgments in the Supreme Court of the United States than to those of the
courts of other Commonwealth countries.
This radical change in the court's approach to the question of construction was achieved at the expense of certainty and predictability. Only the
dictum which is quoted above provides any guidance as to the status of earlier
decisions and of other dispositions and transactions which had previously
been thought to be exempt.3 0 Chief Justice Laskin has recently stated that an
"appellate court, and certainly a final appellate court, is charged not only to
decide the immediate case but also to declare the law of the province or of
the country, as the case may be."31 In this respect both the majority and minority judgments are open to the same criticism which has been levelled at the
court so often in recent years. 32 Unless litigation is to be encouraged it is
important that the court should not only give reasons for its decisions but
should attempt to state them with a precision which is sufficient to provide
guidance for lower courts and for individuals and their professional advisers.
One other general consideration might be mentioned. The court has an
obligation to give effect to Acts of Parliament and it has recognized that this
responsibility will not be discharged by placing the sole emphasis on the
dictionary meaning of the words chosen by the draftsman. In recent cases the
court has placed considerable reliance on what it conceived to be the purpose
or mischief at which a particular statutory provision was directed. The view
that a judge has no authority to attempt to fill gaps in a statute has become
somewhat unfashionable. Yet, to quote Chief Justice Laskin again:
between purpose and the language used to express
...if there is incompatibility
33
it, the latter must govern.

In Re McCreath there seems to be no doubt that the problem was created
because of a major defect in the way in which the statute was drafted. It was
not a case of a simple omission or ambiguity; it was a fundamental defect
which would almost certainly have been removed if the significance of the
decisions in other jurisdictions had been appreciated when the exempting
provision was enacted. If the courts have accepted their authority to fill legislative gaps, it does not follow that they should re-write statutes in order to
remedy legislative errors. Where the statute is notoriously badly drafted and

29 Supra, note 6 at 461 ((1976), 67 D.L.R. (3d) 449).
30

See I Provincial Inheritance and Gift Tax Reporter (CCH) para. 20,028.

"A Judge and His Constituencies" (1976), 7 Manitoba Law J.1 at 5.
For a discussion of a recent example of the confusion caused by the court's
reticence, see (1976), 3 Estates and Trusts Quarterly 93 (R.E.S.).
33
Supra, note 30 at 9.
31

32
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where successive governments have ignored strong recommendations for its
complete revision,3 there was surely something to be said in justification of
judicial restraint. Those who are in favour of death taxation and who applaud the court's repudiation of a rigid application of proprietary concepts
but who, at the same time, believe that the statute in Ontario should either
be revised or be replaced might well regret that restraint was not exercised in
Re McCreath.

s 4 See 3 Report of the Ontario Committee on Taxation (Toronto: Queen's Printer,
1967) at 146-47; Report of The Advisory Committee on Succession Duties (1973),

ch. 2.

